Sufisme dalam Politik Turki

Sufisme dalam Politik Turki

Beberapa minggu lalu, kontroversi penggunaaan turban (jilbab) di Turki berakhir. Mahkamah Konstitusi, akhirnya menolak gugatan kubu sekuler terkait reformasi konstitusi yang diajukan AKP (Adalet Kalkinma Partisi, Partai Keadilan dan Pembangunan). Kini, larangan penggunaan turban di Turki pun dicabut.

Saya hendak melihat fenomena di atas dengan tingkat dukungan/persepsi masyarakat terhadap sekularisme dan aspirasi keagamaan (untuk tidak menyebut islamisme). Hasil survei Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), terhadap 1.500 responden pada 23 Provinsi, 2006 lalu, menunjukkan sekitar 74% responden mengidentifikasi dirinya sebagai Muslim. Pada saat yang sama juga mengindentifikasi dirinya sebagai sekuler (75%).

Bagi saya, data ini menarik. Mungkinkah, identifikasi diri sebagai pendukung sekularisme berjalin kelindan dengan dukungan terhadap aspirasi keagamaan. Itu mungkin: bagi Turki. Herannya, meskipun mendukung partai berbasis Islam, mayoritas publik Turki pun mendukung sekularisme sebagai dasar negara. Dan, reaktif, bila ada ancaman terhadap sekularisme Turki.

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Berbeda dengan model sekularisme di banyak negara Barat. Model sekularisme Turki (kemalisme) lebih banyak mengadopsi sekularisme model Prancis. Sekularisme Turki tidak secara kaku memisahkan antara agama dan negara. Namun, mengontrol agama melalui institusi-institusi negara.

Di Turki, monitoring kegiatan keagamaan dilakukan melalui <i>Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi<p> (Direktorat Hubungan Agama) yang berasalkan dari Sunni. Dalam tugasnya, <i>diyanet<p> melaporkan tugasnya ke Perdana Menteri – tidak ke Kementrian Hubungan Agama. Tak heran bila <i>diyanet<p> mendapat anggaran terbersar dari kementrian negara lainnya.

<i>Diyanet<p> mempunyai dua tugas pokok. Diantaranya, pertama, mengkoordinir kegiatan di 77 ribu masjid dan mengembangkan pendidikan Islam. <i>Diyanet<p> juga bertugas melakukan supervisi terhadap para mufti yang berjumlah 81 orang di setiap provinsi dan di 900 kabupaten/kota. Semua mufti/imam diangkat menjadi pegawai negeri sipil yang berlatar-belakang pendidikan <i>Imam-Hatip dan di 20 Fakultas Teologi.

Menariknya, pada setiap bulannya, para mufti, khatib, dan imam melakukan pertemuan bulanan di provinsi untuk mendiskusikan materi/jadwal khutbah. Meskipun, para khatib dan mufti tersebut dapat mempersiapkan materi khutbah sendiri.

Bila ditarik garis sejarahnya, secara kultural, sufisme telah berkembang sejak Ottoman. Dulu, sufisme melembagakan diri melalui <i>Majlis al-Mesheikh<p> (Dewan Ulama) dan berakhir setelah Ottoman ambruk.

Saya menyadari, meski sekularisme begitu kuat mengontrol agama. Namun, gerakan sufisme berkembang pesat di Turki. Sufisme seolah menjadi counter atas sekularisme dan menjadi basis pendulang suara/pendukung partai-partai berbasis Islam. Sufisme, juga mempunyai jaringan ekonomi dan sosial yang memadai. Sebut saja, dua gerakan sufi yang berpengaruh di Turki seperti Naqsabandiah dan Kadiri.

Pada level elit politik, sufisme justru mewarnai latar-belakarang tradisi keagamaan sejumlah elit politik Turki. Mantan Perdana Menteri Turgut Ozal misalnya, diasosiasikan sebagai pengikut Iskanderpasa Naqsabandiah. Selain Ozal, mantan perdana menteri Necmettin Erbakan, Perdana Menteri Recep Tayyip Erdogan dan Presiden Abdullah Gul pun dilekatkan sebagai pengikut Naqsabandiah.

Sejauh manakah signifikansi/pengaruh sufisme dalam konfigurasi politik Turki? Saya meyakini hingga kini sufisme masih menjadi instrumen pendulang suara yang kuat. Dalam sejarah politik Turki misalnya, pengaruh sufisme/tarikat tampak jelas dalam figur mantan perdana menteri Adnan Menderes. Tak heran, bila dalam pemilu 1950, Adnan Menderes berhasil mengulingkan dominasi kubu sekuler (CHP) lewat dukungan sufisme melalui DP (Partai Demokrat).

Dalam tradisi politik Islam, pembentukan Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP) (National Order Party) dan Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP) (National Salvation Party) oleh Necmettin Erbakan mendapat dukungan kuat dari tokoh Tarikat Naqsabandiah Khalidi, Sheikh Mehmet Zahid Kotku. Sebagai catatan, tarikat Naqsabandiah Khalidi berpusat di masjid Iskanderpasa di Istanbul, Turki.

Pada dekade 1980-an, pengikut tarikat Naqsabandiah, bergabung dengan <i>Motherland Party<p> pimpinan Turgut Ozal. Kini, AKP (the ruling party), menjadi afiliasi politik tarikat Naqsabandiah.

Asumsi saya, kuatnya dukungan terhadap partai berbasis Islam (AKP) secara tradisional hendak menegaskan bahwa gerakan sufisme menjadi pendulang suara yang cukup signifikan bagi. (bersambung)

Ciputat, 4 September 2008

 

A Democratic Islam?

by Daniel Pipes
Jerusalem Post
April 17, 2008

There’s an impression that Muslims suffer disproportionately from the rule of dictators, tyrants, unelected presidents, kings, emirs, and various other strongmen – and it’s accurate. A careful analysis by Frederic L. Pryor of Swarthmore College in the Middle East Quarterly (“Are Muslim Countries Less Democratic?“) concludes that “In all but the poorest countries, Islam is associated with fewer political rights.”

The fact that majority-Muslim countries are less democratic makes it tempting to conclude that the religion of Islam, their common factor, is itself incompatible with democracy.

I disagree with that conclusion. Today’s Muslim predicament, rather, reflects historical circumstances more than innate features of Islam. Put differently, Islam, like all pre-modern religions is undemocratic in spirit. No less than the others, however, it has the potential to evolve in a democratic direction.

Marsiglio of Padua

Such evolution is not easy for any religion. In the Christian case, the battle to limit the Catholic Church’s political role lasted painfully long. If the transition began when Marsiglio of Padua published Defensor pacis in the year 1324, it took another six centuries for the Church fully to reconcile itself to democracy. Why should Islam’s transition be smoother or easier?

To render Islam consistent with democratic ways will require profound changes in its interpretation. For example, the anti-democratic law of Islam, the Shari‘a, lies at the core of the problem. Developed over a millennium ago, it presumes autocratic rulers and submissive subjects, emphasizes God’s will over popular sovereignty, and encourages violent jihad to expand Islam’s borders. Further, it anti-democratically privileges Muslims over non-Muslims, males over females, and free persons over slaves.

Mahmud Muhammad Taha

For Muslims to build fully functioning democracies, they basically must reject the Shari‘a’s public aspects. Atatürk frontally did just that in Turkey, but others have offered more subtle approaches. Mahmud Muhammad Taha, a Sudanese thinker, dispatched the public Islamic laws by fundamentally reinterpreting the Koran.

Atatürk’s efforts and Taha’s ideas imply that Islam is ever-evolving, and that to see it as unchanging is a grave mistake. Or, in the lively metaphor of Hassan Hanafi, professor of philosophy at the University of Cairo, the Koran “is a supermarket, where one takes what one wants and leaves what one doesn’t want.”

Islam’s problem is less its being anti-modern than that its process of modernization has hardly begun. Muslims can modernize their religion, but that requires major changes: Out go waging jihad to impose Muslim rule, second-class citizenship for non-Muslims, and death sentences for blasphemy or apostasy. In come individual freedoms, civil rights, political participation, popular sovereignty, equality before the law, and representative elections.

Two obstacles stand in the way of these changes, however. In the Middle East especially, tribal affiliations remain of paramount importance. As explained by Philip Carl Salzman in his recent book, Culture and Conflict in the Middle East, these ties create a complex pattern of tribal autonomy and tyrannical centralism that obstructs the development of constitutionalism, the rule of law, citizenship, gender equality, and the other prerequisites of a democratic state. Not until this archaic social system based on the family is dispatched can democracy make real headway in the Middle East.

Globally, the compelling and powerful Islamist movement obstructs democracy. It seeks the opposite of reform and modernization – namely, the reassertion of the Shari‘a in its entirety. A jihadist like Osama bin Laden may spell out this goal more explicitly than an establishment politician like Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, but both seek to create a thoroughly anti-democratic, if not totalitarian, order.

Islamists respond two ways to democracy. First, they denounce it as un-Islamic. Muslim Brotherhood founder Hasan al-Banna considered democracy a betrayal of Islamic values. Brotherhood theoretician Sayyid Qutb rejected popular sovereignty, as did Abu al-A‘la al-Mawdudi, founder of Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami political party. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Al-Jazeera television’s imam, argues that elections are heretical.

Despite this scorn, Islamists are eager to use elections to attain power, and have proven themselves to be agile vote-getters; even a terrorist organization (Hamas) has won an election. This record does not render the Islamists democratic but indicates their tactical flexibility and their determination to gain power. As Erdoğan has revealingly explained, “Democracy is like a streetcar. When you come to your stop, you get off.”

Hard work can one day make Islam democratic. In the meanwhile, Islamism represents the world’s leading anti-democratic force.

 

Private Accommodations for Islam

by R. John Matthies
FrontPageMagazine.com
April 18, 2008
http://www.meforum.org/article/1885

When is it appropriate to critique the policies of private enterprise? Private institutions are clearly permitted to carry out their business in a manner appropriate to their market, so long as they operate within the boundaries of the law. However, these institutions – commercial, educational, or the media – also play a major societal role, and hence carry great responsibility. For this reason, the practice of criticizing these institutions is an established tradition, as illustrated by book reviews, theater criticism, Hollywood gossip columns, sports talk, consumer reports, and others. Acknowledging that the critique of private institutions is different from the sort directed at government, we engage private sector entities in consideration of the influence they peddle and (indirect) power they wield.

There are now many cases of Islamists in the West demanding accommodations – and of these demands being met. These range from trivial cases of employee accommodation to cases of gender segregation. While state and local authorities have often bent to the designs of political Islam, it is to private institutions that one turns to examine the most egregious examples of accommodation.

Still, it is more difficult to censure private institutions – given their greater freedom of action – than it is to censure lawmakers and public institutions, which are directly charged with serving the public good. Private entities have the right to run their own affairs, but the public cannot condone exceptions that result in exclusion or promote a regime of segregation. Merchants are free to choose the services or products they offer to target consumers and hence maximize profit. But to deny service to one group – or create hardship for select employees – to accommodate the wishes of another is unacceptable. Those policies that dismiss the rights of others – whether in a place of work, study, or commerce – must not be tolerated. For this reason, it is fitting to explore cases of accommodation with an eye both to the exceptional nature of the concession (in light of existing practice) and the degree to which group accommodation results in restricted movement, hampered speech, or great inconvenience to the majority.

In the case of Britain’s Sainsbury’s convenience stores, for example, Muslim employees who prefer to avoid contact with alcoholic beverages for reason of religion are asked to raise their hands so a colleague can replace them at their post or scan the item for them. And those who object to stocking shelves with wine, beer, and spirits have found alternative positions within the company. A similar example is credited to Target, where Muslim employees at a Minneapolis store have been dispensed with handling pork products, for fear of contamination.

Sainsbury’s and Target have elected to satisfy employee wishes; the pertinent question is whether management has enacted these policies because it feels it’s the right thing to do, or simply because no other options exist to fill the positions presently occupied by recalcitrant employees. (A spokeswoman for Sainsbury’s admits as much, saying: “At the application stage we ask the relevant questions regarding any issues about handling different products and where we can we will try and accommodate any requirements people have.”) If the latter is the case, it is difficult to imagine what these vendors can do or what suggestions we might offer. And so we tolerate exceptions of this kind – with the caveat that one must guard against those accommodations that infringe upon the rights of others (and do not merely inconvenience).

Both state and federal law are clear that employers are obliged to accommodate employees’ religious beliefs where these are “reasonable” and do not detract from profitability. But this test fails to account for the inconvenience brought upon employees, which goes to the heart of the fairness issue. At the same time, it is clear that inconvenience extends to paying customers, who are forced to wait while another is found to handle the transaction – to say nothing of the degrading sort of treatment to which the customer is subjected, who must appear to create a disturbance for wishing to purchase an “elicit” product. All told, these examples speak to the question of the degree to which Islam may be allowed to disengage from society.

At the same time, it is also unacceptable for private concerns to enforce Islamic space of their own accord. Consider Harvard University’s decision to institute women-only gym hours to accommodate the modesty requirements of campus Muslims, for example. Islamic Knowledge Committee officer Ola Aljawhary says: “These hours are necessary because there is a segment of the Harvard female population that is not found in gyms not because they don’t want to work out, but because for them working out in a co-ed gym is uncomfortable, awkward or problematic in some way.” But Harvard administrators explicitly noted that the new policy has less to do with gender than religion; and one reports that the Harvard Islamic Society itself was unaware of the change “until it was being formalized and in its final stages.” It is one thing for young women to make their own private arrangements to accommodate a requirement for modesty, but it is quite another for a university to make these arrangements. Harvard must be asked to imagine where policies like these might lead (which others might be excluded), and to consider the motives of groups in support of such a program.

As one explores cases of accommodation and abuse of influence across the private sphere, one must judge each according to a scale that accounts for both the exceptional nature of the concession and the degree to which the majority is inconvenienced, restricted as to movement, or hampered in expression. Private concerns may be compelled by situation and environment to alter established practice; but for these same concerns to impose a program of segregation or apply select “Islamic” standards constitutes a grave abuse of influence.

 

Will Geert Wilders Show His Film on the Koran?

Will Geert Wilders Show His Film on the Koran?

by Daniel Pipes
Weblog
December 29, 2007

By my count, there have been six major episodes in modern times in which Muslims rioted and killed in protest to some Western-based person making comments about Islam:

• 1989 – Salman Rushdie publishes his novel, The Satanic Verses.
• 1997 – The U.S. Supreme Court refuses to remove a 1930s frieze showing Muhammad as lawgiver.
• 2002 – The American evangelical leader Jerry Falwell calls Muhammad a “terrorist.”
• 2005 – An incorrect story in Newsweek, reporting that American interrogators at Guantánamo Bay, “in an attempt to rattle suspects, flushed a Qur’an down a toilet.”
• February 2006 – The Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten publishes twelve cartoons of Muhammad.
• September 2006 – Pope Benedict XVI quotes a Byzantine emperor’s views that what is new in Islam is “evil and inhuman.”

Geert Wilders, head of the Freedom Party in the Netherlands.

Every one of these cases shares one particular feature: the persons who set off the ruckus had little to no idea that their views would lead to riots and deaths. Muslim disapproval, yes, not upheaval.

That’s about to change with the expected television premier on January 25 of an un-named film by a leading Dutch politician Geert Wilders dealing with the Koran. Wilders in the past has compared it to Hitler’s Mein Kampf and wants it banned; the film will likely make arguments along these lines: “With this film I’m trying to show not only in words but also images exactly what I mean,” he says.

 

Unlike the British, American, Danish governments or the Vatican, the Dutch government has prepared. It has adopted a two-track policy of (1) trying to stop the screening and, should that fail, (2) getting ready for crisis mode. An article in today’s Volkskrant, “Vrees voor rellen rond Koran-film van Wilders” (translated as “Fear of riots over Wilders’ Koran film“) provides some details. First, the government is trying to shut things down:

• The Justice Ministry is investigating whether anything can be done to prevent the film from airing.
• When it was leaked that Wilders was coming out with an anti-Koran film, three ministers warned him of the possible consequences.

Should this not succeed, preparatory steps are underway:

• Security around Wilders, which was already heavy, is being beefed up.
• The Amsterdam police have had interviews with imams and other influential persons in the Muslim community this month to prepare for their reactions. A scenario is being prepared for major public order problems. Similar measures are being taken in the Hague and Utrecht.
• Investigations are also underway to see whether Wilders will have to acquire a specially secured residence and whether his fellow party members will require security.
• The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has since informed all of its diplomatic posts … to explain to other countries that the Cabinet has distanced itself from the film.

The opening shot of the Wilders film: “Waarschuwing: dit boek bevat schokkende beelden” (Warning: this book contains disturbing images)

Comments: (1) That a lone individual, a Rushdie or a Wilders, is in the position of driving a state’s policy makes this situation so fascinating and anomalous. I addressed this unprecedented situation in my 1989 book, The Rushdie Affair:

 

In a strange reversal, governments waited on the statements issued by a private citizen. Never before had this happened. Nor had an individual’s choice of words ever borne so directly on the course of international relations. The situation was especially anomalous in Great Britain, where the authorities at one point felt compelled to deny that they had cleared a pronouncement made by Rushdie. As a news item reported it, with reference to his February 19[, 1989] apology,

Whitehall sources said the Foreign Office had not asked to see the statement in advance. It was volunteered by the publishers. The Foreign Office had not taken any initiative or tried to influence the publishers in any way, nor was there any question that the Foreign Office had “cleared” or “approved” the statement, or taken any view about it.

 

The absurdity of the situation was caught by a cartoon in Le Monde which showed Rushdie at his typewriter, surrounded by fifteen harried bobbies all keeping an eye on him; one of the policemen barks into the walkie-talkie, “Close the airports!! He wants to write volume two!!!”

(2) When a citizen holds his government hostage, the latter is inevitably tempted to shut down his freedom of expression. Indeed, Wilders has complained of “pure political intimidation” by the cabinet and “unacceptable” pressure being placed on him to desist, including sending the public prosecutor after him. Thus does the Islamist challenge test the principles of Western governments as never before. Put differently, will Westerners resist dhimmitude or succumb to it? The outcome is by no means assured. (December 29, 2007)

 

Jan. 5, 2008 update: Wilders’ original intention was to show his film in the time-slot on Dutch television available to the party he heads, the PVV. But as tensions rise and the authorities become increasingly skittish about showing it, he is considering the idea of first showing the film on YouTube.com.

Jan. 19, 2008 update: A “Wilders film roundup” at the Islam in Europe website reports: The Dutch cabinet has met in top secret sessions [though apparently not top secret enough] to talk about possible repercussions and measures to prevent them. These include quick evacuation of Dutch citizens from Muslim countries. The government is expecting riots, flag burnings and boycotts, and has informed municipalities and police to be ready for such eventualities. Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende expect a serious crisis situation, though he says there is “no reason for panic”. Balkenende says Wilders is responsible for the film’s contents and the job of the cabinet is to be ready for possible consequences. There have been reports from Dutch embassies in Muslim countries saying that things might get critical. The Dutch embassies have warned their citizens of possible negative reactions.

 

Jan. 21, 2008 update: Tehran has now spoken:

Alaeddin Boroujerdi, head of the Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, promised widespread protests and a review of Iran’s relationship with the Netherlands if Dutch lawmaker Geert Wilders’ work is shown. “If Holland will allow the broadcast of this movie, the Iranian parliament will request to reconsider our relationship with it,” Boroujerdi said, according to IRNA, the official Iranian news agency. “In Iran, insulting Islam is a very sensitive matter and if the movie is broadcasted it will arouse a wave of popular hate that will be directed towards any government that insults Islam.

 

Jan. 26, 2008 update: The threats are coming in, right on schedule. Chris Caldwell sums up a couple of them: At the European parliament in Strasbourg last week, Ahmad Badr al-Din Hassoun, Grand Mufti of Syria, warned that Mr Wilders would be responsible for any “violence and bloodshed” that resulted from his film – and that the Dutch people would, in turn, be responsible for reining him in. Noor Farida Ariffin, the departing Malaysian ambassador, told De Volkskrant: “Compared to what I’m expecting, the riots over the Danish cartoons will look like a picnic.”

Caldwell also quotes the foreign minister, Maxime Verhagen, saying about the dreaded film that “freedom of expression doesn’t mean the right to offend.” Should he be right, then of what value or interest is freedom of expression?

 

Feb. 29, 2008 update: The Washington Times quotes Stephen Suleyman Schwartz, director of the Washington-based Center for Islamic Pluralism, who offers a common sensical and helpful response: “My advice to Muslims is to ignore such trivial provocations, maintain their dignity and faith and work to improve their communities. Mr. Wilders has a right to make whatever films he wants and Muslims have a right to ignore them.”

 

Mar. 3, 2008 update: The Dutch government, undeterred either by its country’s distinguished history of freedom of speech or the reach of the Internet, is trying to shut Wilders down before his film gets out. A newspaper reports that “the coalition government was divided on the film, with the Christian Democrats leaning towards a ban but Labour favouring freedom of expression and calling on Muslim countries to prevent violence against the Netherlands.”

 

Mar. 5, 2008 update: A survey of threats to the Netherlands, should the film be shown: “Iranian Justice Minister Gholam-Hossein Elham asked the Netherlands to ban the film. Hundreds of people protested the picture at the Dutch embassy in Indonesia and Pakistan briefly blocked access to Google Inc.’s YouTube site because of reports of a trailer for the film.” A poll shows three-quarters of Dutch fear the film will worsen relations between Muslims and non- Muslims, while two-thirds expect the film to prompt boycotts of Dutch goods. Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen demands that Wilders not go forward: “I find it irresponsible to broadcast this film because Dutch companies, soldiers and citizens outside the Netherlands will be in danger.”

 

Mar. 6, 2008 update: The Dutch government – which Wilders accuses of exacerbating the problem by its dire warmings – has raised the terrorism alert level to “substantial”, the second-highest alert level. It did so even though the Ministry of Justice acknowledges “there is no concrete evidence” of an attack.

 

Mar. 7, 2008 update: No Dutch television station will air Wilder’s 15-minute film Fitna on his terms, which is to say no censorship or editing. “I had hoped that a television broadcaster would say: ‘You have the right to do this, we will give you a podium’,” he told NRC Handelsblad.

 

Mar. 27, 2008 update: Fitna appeared today, not on a television station but on the internet, where within hours millions had viewed it. The film shows how aggressive verses of the Koran correlate closely with the actions of Islamists today, implying that Islamists are doing nothing more than being good Muslims. Now that the film is done and out, the question is, how much of a furor will it in fact raise?

Comment: I disagree with the one-to-one correlation of the Koran with Islamist behavior, as though 1,400 years had not passed in between, but I concede the film’s simple, powerful argument.

 

Apr. 1, 2008 update: Writing in The Jerusalem Post, Manfred Gerstenfeld explains the ironic reason how the Wilders film achieved such international notoriety:

The main contributor to the tremendous attention the movie has received internationally is Dutch Prime Minister Hans Peter Balkenende. Wilders has remained largely silent since he announced its preparation last November. Balkenende, however, went on record saying that due to the (not yet existing) movie, the Netherlands was in major crisis. The government informed municipalities on how to prepare for possible riots which might erupt and which could last several days.

 

Dutch embassies were given emergency instructions. Trade unions asked the government to protect Dutch employees in Arab countries, including KLM Airlines flight personnel. Concerns were also expressed regarding possible increased attacks on the Dutch NATO forces in Afghanistan. All this and much more was made public and led to an enormous media hype, turning Wilders into the best-known Dutch politician worldwide.

 

 

Will Europe Resist Islamization?

Will Europe Resist Islamization?

by Daniel Pipes
Jerusalem Post
April 3, 2008
http://www.danielpipes.org/article/5503

[JP title: "A movie and a conversion: Europe begins to resist?"]

Some analysts of Islam in Western Europe argue that the continent cannot escape its Eurabian fate; that the trend lines of the past half-century will continue until Muslims become a majority population and Islamic law (the Shari‘a) reigns.

I disagree, arguing that there is another route the continent might take, one of resistance to Islamification and a reassertion of traditional ways. Indigenous Europeans – who make up 95 percent of the population – can insist on their historic customs and mores. Were they to do so, nothing would be in their way and no one could stop them.

 

Indeed, Europeans are visibly showing signs of impatience with creeping Shari‘a. The legislation in France that prohibits hijabs from public school classrooms signals the reluctance to accept Islamic ways, as are related efforts to ban burqas, mosques, and minarets. Throughout Western Europe, anti-immigrant parties are generally increasing in popularity.

 

That resistance took a new turn last week, with two dramatic events. First, on March 22, Pope Benedict XVI himself baptized, confirmed, and gave the Eucharist to Magdi Allam, 56, a prominent Egyptian-born Muslim long living in Italy, where he is a top editor at the Corriere della Sera newspaper and a well-known author. Allam took the middle name Cristiano. The ceremony converting him to the Catholic religion could not have been higher profile, occurring at a nighttime service at St. Peter’s Basilica on the eve of Easter Sunday, with exhaustive coverage from the Vatican and many other television stations.

 

Allam followed up his conversion with a stinging statement in which he argued that beyond “the phenomenon of Islamic extremism and terrorism that has appeared on a global level, the root of evil is inherent in an Islam that is physiologically violent and historically conflictive.” In other words, the problem is not just Islamism but Islam itself. One commentator, “Spengler” of Asia Times, goes so far as to say that Allam “presents an existential threat to Muslim life” because he “agrees with his former co-religionists in repudiating the degraded culture of the modern West, and offers them something quite different: a religion founded upon love.”

 

Second, on March 27, Geert Wilders, 44, released his long-awaited, 15-minute film, Fitna, which consists of some of the most bellicose verses of the Koran, followed by actions in accord with those verses carried out by Islamists in recent years. The obvious implication is that Islamists are simply acting in accord with their scriptures. In Allam’s words, Wilders also argues that “the root of evil is inherent” in Islam.

Unlike Allam and Wilders, I do distinguish between Islam and Islamism, but I believe it imperative that their ideas get a fair hearing, without vituperation or punishment. An honest debate over Islam must take place.

 

If Allam’s conversion was a surprise and Wilders’ film had a three-month run-up, in both cases, the aggressive, violent reactions that met prior criticisms of Islam did not take place. According to the Los Angeles Times, the Dutch police contacted imams to gauge reactions at the city’s mosques and found, according to police spokesman Arnold Aben, “it’s quieter than usual here today. Sort of like a holiday.” In Pakistan, a rally against the film attracted only some dozens of protestors.

 

This relatively constrained reaction points to the fact that Muslim threats sufficed to enforce censorship. Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende denounced Fitna and, after 3.6 million visitors had viewed it on the British website LiveLeak.com, the company announced that “Following threats to our staff of a very serious nature, … Liveleak has been left with no other choice but to remove Fitna from our servers.” (Two days later, however, LiveLeak again posted the film.)

 

Three similarities bear noting: both Allam (author of a book titled Viva Israele) and Wilders (whose film emphasizes Muslim violence against Jews) stand up for Israel and the Jews; Muslim threats against their lives have forced both for years to live under state-provided round-the-clock police protection; and, more profoundly, the two share a passion for European civilization.

 

Indeed, Allam and Wilders may represent the vanguard of a Christian/liberal reassertion of European values. It is too soon to predict, but these staunch individuals could provide a crucial boost for those intent on maintaining the continent’s historic identity.

 

Mr. Pipes, director of the Middle East Forum, is the Taube/Diller Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University during the spring semester.